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A
mAbstract
A central issue in estimating the employment effects of minimum wages is the
appropriate comparison group for states (or other regions) that adopt or increase
the minimum wage. In recent research, Dube et al. (Rev Econ Stat 92:945-964, 2010)
and Allegretto et al. (Ind Relat 50:205-240, 2011) argue that past U.S. research is
flawed because it does not restrict comparison areas to those that are geographically
proximate and fails to control for changes in low-skill labor markets that are correlated
with minimum wage increases. They argue that using “local controls” establishes that
higher minimum wages do not reduce employment of less-skilled workers. In Neumark
et al. (Ind Labor Relat Rev 67:608-648, 2014), we present evidence that their methods
fail to isolate more reliable identifying information and lead to incorrect conclusions.
Moreover, for subsets of treatment groups where the identifying variation they use is
supported by the data, the evidence is consistent with past findings of disemployment
effects. Allegretto SA, Dube A, Reich M, Zipperer B (2013a) Credible research designs for
minimum wage studies. IZA Discussion Paper No. 7638, Bonn, Germany have challenged
our conclusions, continuing the debate regarding some key issues regarding choosing
comparison groups for estimating minimum wage effects. We explain these issues and
evaluate the evidence. In general, we find little basis for their analyses and conclusions
and argue that the best evidence still points to job loss from minimum wages for very
low-skilled workers – in particular, for teens.
JEL codes: J23; J38
Keywords: Minimum wages; Employment; Comparison groups
Introduction
Recent debate on the employment effects of minimum wages has focused on the
proper specification of the control groups for estimating the effects of minimum
wages. This is a long-standing issue that has been confronted in different ways begin-
ning with research in the early part of the last century (Neumark et al., 2014). In the
current incarnation of this debate, Dube et al. (2010, hereafter DLR) and Allegretto
et al. (2011, hereafter ADR) have argued that to obtain valid estimates of minimum
wage effects it is essential to control for “spatial heterogeneity”, using nearby geo-
graphic areas as controls to better account for where and when minimum wages are
adopted or increased. Moreover, based on their specifications of how best to control
for this spatial heterogeneity, DLR and ADR have put forward a severe critique of the
findings from much of the existing U.S. evidence on the employment effects of minimum
wages using state-level panel data. They argue that this evidence is biased because of “a
spurious negative relationship between the minimum wage and employment for low wage2014 Neumark et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly credited.
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negative shocks to the employment of affected workers unrelated to minimum wage effects.
Their evidence in support of this claim comes from implementing two types of what
they refer to as “local controls”. The first is the inclusion in their regression models of
jurisdiction-specific linear time trends. The second is the inclusion of interactions
between period dummy variables and dummy variables for sets of nearby states or
neighboring counties, so that minimum wage effects are identified only net of common
changes within these sets. Based on these two approaches, they argue (in DLR, for
example) that there are “no detectable employment losses from the kind of minimum
wage increases we have seen in the United States” (p. 962).
In Neumark et al. (2014, hereafter NSW), we presented evidence that the methods advo-
cated in these studies do not isolate more reliable identifying information (i.e., better
comparison groups) and thus are flawed and lead to incorrect conclusions. In one case –
the issue of state-specific trends – we explicitly demonstrate the problem with their
methods and show how more appropriate ways of controlling for unobserved trends that
affect teen employment lead to evidence of disemployment effects similar to past studies. In
the other case – identifying minimum wage effects from the variation within Census divi-
sions or, even more narrowly, within contiguous cross-border county pairs – we show that
the exclusion of other regions or counties as potential controls is generally not supported
by the data. Moreover, for regions where restricting the identifying variation in this way is
supported by the data, the evidence is consistent with past findings of disemployment
effects. Finally, when we let the data determine the appropriate control states to use for esti-
mating the effects of state minimum wage increases in the Current Population Survey
(CPS) data, we find evidence of disemployment effects for teens, with elasticities near −0.15.
Most recently, Allegretto et al. (2013a, hereafter ADRZ) have criticized our conclu-
sions, attacking much of our evidence. In the present paper, we lay out several issues
that we see as forming the crux of this debate about the use of local controls to con-
struct better comparison groups and provide our own analysis of these issues. In
general, we find little basis for the alternative analyses and conclusions ADRZ present,
and we conclude that the best evidence still points to job loss from minimum wages
for low-skilled workers – in particular for teens.1
In our view, the key issue is whether the identifying assumptions entailed by ADR’s
and DLR’s use of local controls lead to more biased or less biased estimates of the
employment effect of minimum wages. Our previous work concluded that the assump-
tions implicit in their methods bias the estimated effect toward zero. The issue was not
simply whether the variation left unused by DLR and ADR reduced the efficiency of
their estimates of the employment effects of minimum wages. Labor economists often
use approaches thought to reduce bias at the cost of less precise estimates. In the final
section of this paper we provide a possible explanation for why limiting attention to
local controls might produce a bias towards finding no employment effect and cite
recent evidence from Baskaya and Rubinstein (2012) consistent with this explanation.
At the same time, estimation of richer specifications prompted by some of the analyses
presented by ADRZ undermines the conclusion that, for teens, including local controls
reduces the estimated employment effect of the minimum wage. So in either case, the
claim that controlling for spatial heterogeneity establishes that minimum wages do not
reduce employment of unskilled workers is unfounded.2
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The central element of the papers by ADR and DLR is their use of specifications that
identify effects only from states in the same Census division (in ADR) or from pairs of
contiguous counties straddling state borders (in DLR). The implicit assumption in these
specifications is that geographically proximate areas provide better controls. However, as
discussed in NSW, one can actually test this assumption using tools borrowed from the
synthetic control approach to estimating treatment effects (Abadie et al., 2010). And in
the context of the ADR and DLR studies, we showed that the weight put on nearby states
or counties as potential controls (or “donors”, in the language of the synthetic control lit-
erature) for states or counties in which minimum wages increased were generally no
higher than the weight put on states or counties farther away, and indeed that these
nearby states or counties tended to get no more weight than a randomly-selected state or
county.
In their response, ADRZ claim that we have glossed over an important conceptual
issue – namely, that “examining weights within Census divisions and comparing these
to weights outside divisions does not tell us whether comparing local areas is better
than using state panel regressions with two-way fixed effects” (p. 63). However, we did
not present the results of our synthetic control analysis as an explicit validation of the
standard two-way fixed effects estimator, and by setting up this straw man, ADRZ dis-
tract attention from our main point: The synthetic control analysis is informative about
whether to focus on local controls or not because it tells us whether it makes sense to
put all the weight on the within-region variation (Census divisions in ADR and cross-
border county pairs in DLR) or instead to put weight on variation from outside the re-
gion as well (however that weight might be distributed). In particular, for the analysis
of state-level data, we reported that the average weight per same-division donor state is
higher than 1/(number of potential donors) in only 18 of 50 cases; that is, in more than
60 percent of cases, the average weight on same-division donor states based on the syn-
thetic control matching is less than the weight we would get if all potential donors were
weighted equally.Weights on same-division states vs. other states
ADRZ also dispute our calculation of the weights, arguing (focusing on the CPS
analysis) that the evidence actually shows that, “A donor state within the same division
receives weights that are 2.8 to 4.1 times as large as weights for donors outside of the
division” (p. 66). For example, for our matching on regression residuals in Table 3 of
NSW, they calculate that the average weight per donor state in the same Census
division is 0.098, versus 0.035 for other states, for a ratio of 2.806 (the source for their
first number cited above; see their Table B1). Thus, ADRZ conclude, “a straightforward
interpretation of NSW’s own evidence indicates that neighboring areas are more alike
than are places farther away – contradicting their central thesis” (p. 66).
This is a direct contradiction of the results we report – i.e., that the weight on same-
division states is generally no higher than the weight on states in other divisions. But
ADRZ’s conclusion is based on a flawed calculation that weights states in a manner that
mechanically tends to produce a high ratio of the weight they compute on same-
division versus non-same-division states.3
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S denote the number of same-division states in treatment j, and let




























That is, they add up all the weight on same-division states across all the treatments,and divide that by the number of treatments, and divide that by the total number of
same-division states in all the treatments, also dividing that by the number of treat-
ments. They then do the same calculation for other-division states and compute the ra-
tio of the two.
This calculation puts very high weight on the treatments with large number of donors.
In the data, the number of donors varies widely across treatments, and the number of
other-division donors can be very large. The number of same-division donors ranges
from 1 to 8, with a standard deviation of 2, while the number of non-same-division
donors varies from 1 to 45, with a standard deviation of 18. As a result, ADRZ’s calcula-
tion is particularly sensitive to the observations on other-division donors from treat-
ments with large numbers of such donors. Because the number of other-division donors
can be so much higher, the ratio of the expression in equation (1) for same-division rela-
tive to other-division states tends to get blown up by this feature of ADRZ’s calculation.
The top panel of Table 1 provides an illustrative example. The table shows the num-
ber of donors in the same and the other divisions in each of five hypothetical treat-
ments and the weights each state gets in the hypothetical synthetic control analysis. In
this example, there are four treatments with the same number of same-division and
other-division donors (two of each). In these four treatments, the weight on each same-
division state (0.24) is slightly less than the weight on each other-division state (0.26).
In the fifth treatment, there are also two donors in the same-division states, each with
weight of 0.02, and a large number of non-donor states (48) – mimicking what actually
happens in the data – each with the same weight as the same-division states (0.02).
If these weights resulted from a synthetic control analysis like the one we proposed,
what would we conclude? In four of the five treatments, the average weight on other-
division states is higher (0.26 vs. 0.24), while in the fifth the weight on same-division
states is the same (0.02). We would argue that the interpretation of this kind of evi-
dence from a synthetic control analysis would be similar to the interpretation in NSW:
There is no strong evidence that more weight – let alone all the weight – should go on
same-division states.
But what does ADRZ’s calculation suggest? Using equation (1) and its equivalent ver-
sion for other-division states, the resulting value is 3.61 (reported in the table), within
the range they use to conclude that same-division states are much more alike – i.e.,
better controls – than other-division states. Yet looking at the weights for example 1 in
Table 1, this does not seem a supportable conclusion.
One could use the unweighted average of the ratio of the weights on same-division to
other-division states, which would be equal to 0.938, indicating slightly lower weight on
same-division states, which seems like the right answer. Alternatively, if one wanted
to use a calculation more comparable to the calculation ADRZ claim to present –
Table 1 Examples of weights on same-division states and other-division states
Same division Other division
Weight per state # states Weight per state # states
Example 1
Treatment 1 .24 2 .26 2
Treatment 2 .24 2 .26 2
Treatment 3 .24 2 .26 2
Treatment 4 .24 2 .26 2
Treatment 5 .02 2 .02 48
ADRZ calculation (equation (1)) 80:24þ20:02
5f g= 105f g
80:26þ480:02
5f g= 565f g ¼ 3:61
Equation (2) calculation 4 0:482ð Þþ1 0:042ð Þf g=5
4 0:522ð Þþ1 0:9648ð Þf g=5 ¼ 0:925
Example 2
Treatment 1 .24 2 .26 2
Treatment 2 .24 2 .26 2
Treatment 3 .24 2 .26 2
Treatment 4 .24 2 .26 2
Treatment 5 .01 4 .01 96
ADRZ calculation (equation (1)) 80:24þ40:01
5f g= 125f g
80:26þ960:01
5f g= 1045f g ¼ 5:59
Equation (2) calculation 4 0:482ð Þþ1 0:044ð Þf g=5
4 0:522ð Þþ1 0:9696ð Þf g=5 ¼ 0:924
Neumark et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2014, 3:24 Page 5 of 26
http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/24“average per-donor weight of same-division donors, relative to the per-donor weight
of the other-division donors” (p. 65) – one would want to use the following equa-










and the corresponding equation for other-division controls. In that case, example 1yields the number 0.925 (reported in the table). Thus, the number resulting from
ADRZ’s calculation seems much too high.5
Example 2 in Table 1 makes it even clearer that ADRZ’s calculation is flawed. In this
example, we simply modify treatment 5 so that there are twice as many same-division
donors and twice as many other-division donors – and correspondingly we cut the
weight on each state in half. It seems obvious to us that the conclusion one draws
about appropriate donors from example 2 should be the same as example 1: There are
still four of five treatments for which the weight on other-division states is higher. Yet
because the ADRZ calculation upweights the large number of donors, the resulting
number increases by more than 50 percent, from 3.61 to 5.59. In contrast, the calcula-
tion using equation (2) scarcely changes. Finally, both of the numbers resulting from
ADRZ’s calculation far exceed one, even though the weight on same-division states is
equal to or less than the weight on other-division states for every treatment.
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resulting from ADRZ’s calculation does not have a sensible interpretation with regard to
which states are the appropriate controls; and (2) that it is highly sensitive to differences
that have no bearing on the evaluation of same-division and other-division states as con-
trols. We therefore stand by the conclusion from our synthetic control analysis that there
is little or no evidence to indicate that same-division states are better controls than other-
division states, and certainly no evidence that the latter should be excluded as controls.
ADRZ also present a synthetic control analysis that does not use minimum wage
increases to identify treatment observations, but randomly assigns a placebo minimum
wage law to an individual state in a time period and then calculates the synthetic control
donor weights for all remaining states. They suggest that this approach is informative
because it “dispenses with the shortcomings” (p. 34) of the kind of analysis we did, by which
they mean that we could use only a subset of minimum wage increases as treatments for
the synthetic control analysis. Their Figure eight shows that their computed weights decline
monotonically with distance from the treated state to the donor state, up to about 1,000
miles (and then are flat). This evidence, they argue, “unambiguously demonstrates that the
synthetic control algorithm assigns much greater weight to nearby states when constructing
the counterfactual teen employment” (p. 34).
However, this approach strikes us as uninformative about the question at hand –
whether a particular subset of states provides a more valid set of controls for states
where the minimum wage actually does increase. Since the whole point of the approach
taken in ADR and DLR is their presumption that actual minimum wage increases are
associated with the residuals of the estimated employment regressions (either because
of policy endogeneity or coincidence), we want to know precisely whether the nearby
states provide better controls for these treatment observations. As we have already dis-
cussed and in contrast to ADRZ’s claims, the data indicate that for the minimum wage
increases observed in the data, the same-division states do not provide better controls.
We present additional evidence on this below.Treatments used in the synthetic control analysis
We also present some analyses that attempt to use the synthetic control estimator to
identify control observations and then estimate the effects of minimum wages on em-
ployment based on those controls. ADRZ criticize our matching estimator because the
subset of “clean” minimum wage increases – treatments with donors that have no mini-
mum wage increases in the previous four quarters and the following three – does not
produce a negative and significant minimum wage effect (the estimated elasticity is only
around −0.06 in the state-level data). In particular, since we suggested in our paper that
the fact that we do not replicate the standard panel data estimator using this subset of
minimum wage increases made this subset of minimum wage increases “unusual,” they
question whether it is valid to use this subset of increases to assess the plausibility of
restricting attention to neighboring states as controls, as we do in our synthetic control
analysis. We think it is useful to assess whether ADR and DLR throw out states or
counties that are valid controls for the subset of minimum wage increases for which
the analysis is cleanest. However, the answer does not depend on restricting attention
to these minimum wage increases.
Table 2 Mean synthetic control weights per state in same division and other divisions, CPS data at state by quarter level, 1990 – 2011:Q2



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
New England 0.029 0.025 0.038 0.032 0.016 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.020
Mid-Atlantic 0.015 0.013 0.026 0.015 0.010 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
East North Central 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.010 0.016 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.020
West North Central 0.021 0.024 0.098 0.022 0.015 0.020 0.019 0.009 0.020 0.021
South Atlantic 0.027 0.027 0.022 0.020 0.026 0.019 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.019
East South Central 0.039 0.040 0.029 0.041 0.025 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.020
West South Central 0.011 0.010 0.024 0.015 0.015 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.020
Mountain 0.017 0.017 0.023 0.027 0.025 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.019 0.019
Pacific 0.024 0.025 0.031 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.020
All 0.022 0.022 0.035 0.023 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.018 0.020 0.020
Notes: Table reports calculations from synthetic control matching on all minimum wage increases in the sample period. The donor pool used consists of all states other than the treatment state. The estimates in
columns (1), (2), (6), and (7) are based on residuals from panel data estimates of the log of the teen employment rate on fixed state and period effects and controls for the aggregate unemployment rate and the



















Table 3 Mean synthetic control weights per county for contiguous and non-contiguous counties, county-level QCEW data, 1990–2006:Q2



















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.013
10th percentile 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.019
25th percentile 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
Median 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
75th percentile 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
90th percentile 0.024 0.024 0.026 0.023 0.019 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
Maximum 0.484 0.493 0.336 0.412 0.219 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.020
Mean 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.020
Notes: Table reports calculations from synthetic control matching on all minimum wage increases in the sample period. The donor pool used consists of the top 50 counties with the lowest RMSPE from all states other
than the treatment state, adding in contiguous cross-border counties if they are not already in this set of 50. The estimates in columns (1), (2), (6), and (7) are based on residuals from panel data estimates of the log of
the ratio of restaurant employment to county population on fixed county and period effects and controls for the log of the ratio of aggregate private-sector employment to county population. The log of the minimum
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Tables 3 and 5 of NSW, with the matching now done on all observations where there
was a minimum wage change. Clearly this is more problematic because the frequency
of minimum wage changes implies that “donors” can be contaminated in either the
pre- or post-treatment period relative to any treatment state. For that reason, we think
the most informative matching is on residuals from the standard employment equation,
to account for this minimum wage variation – although this raises the issue of what es-
timated effect of the minimum wage to use in computing these residuals. We therefore
follow what we did in NSW and report these estimates matching on residuals based on
the standard panel data estimates, as well as estimates in which we zero out the effect
of the minimum wage. These two alternatives can be interpreted as covering the range
of most estimates in the debate to date.6
Table 2 reports the results for teen employment using the CPS data. Comparisons of
columns (1)-(5) with columns (6)-(10) show that almost without exception there is very
little basis for restricting attention to the same-division states as controls. The per-state
synthetic control weights – computed appropriately, as discussed earlier – are generally
quite similar for the same-division and other-division states.7 Table 3 reports the
county-level analysis. Here, there is even more compelling evidence that contiguous
counties are not better controls, as the per-county synthetic control weight is generally
larger for non-contiguous counties.
Figures 1 and 2 report additional information on how the weight assigned to
“control” states (or counties) from this analysis varies with distance from the minimum
wage increase in question – similar to what ADRZ did in their paper, but now focusing
on actual minimum wage variation rather than a randomly-assigned placebo.8 For the
analysis that matches on residuals from the specification that restricts the minimum
wage effect to be zero, Figure 1 shows that there is a modest increase in the synthetic
control weight as one gets closer to a treated state – although a much smaller ascentFigure 1 Synthetic control weight vs. distance to treatment states (based on Table 2, columns (2)
and (7)). Notes: “lowess8” uses running-line least squares and a bandwidth of 0.8. The “4” ending indicates
a bandwidth of 0.4, and the “m” extension implies that running means are used instead of running-line
least squares.
Figure 2 Synthetic control weight vs. distance to treatment counties (based on Table 3, columns (2)
and (7)). Note: See notes to Figure 1.
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where the weight is actually lower for the closer counties. (ADRZ did not report any
results along these lines for counties).Issue 2: Pre-trends as evidence of spatial heterogeneity
ADRZ assert that the standard panel data model with only fixed state and year effects
exhibits spurious pre-trends, with large negative leading effects of minimum wages up
to three years prior to minimum wage increases (their Figures 6 and B1). Moreover,
they argue that the models with division × quarter fixed effects and state-specific linear
trends do not exhibit these pre-trends. They use this claim to bolster their general
contention about spatial heterogeneity (although, of course, more relevant is whether
there are negative shocks to youth labor markets contemporaneous with minimum wage
increases).
However, we have been unable to replicate these results from ADRZ; indeed, we get
quite different answers.10 As a preliminary, we would make two points. First, given that
our earlier paper raised sufficient doubts about the inclusion of linear state trends, we
believe the key question is whether the addition of the division × quarter interactions
are needed. Moreover, we would argue that the region × period interactions represent
the central innovation that ADR and DLR proposed and provide an easily interpretable
alternative (and restricted) identification strategy based solely on within-region vari-
ation. Hence, we focus on the role of these spatial controls.11 Second, ADRZ provide
figures that appear to be based on models with leads only. Although it does not bear
on our inability to replicate their results, we would argue that it is more appropriate to
estimate models that include the possible real effects of minimum wages – i.e., those
that occur contemporaneously or with a lag – if for no other reason than that the
actual contemporaneous or lagged effects would otherwise be omitted variables.12
Panel A of Figure 3 reports results where we include leads and lags of up to three
years. The estimates shown are the cumulative sum of these, beginning at a lead of 12
A. With Leads and Lags
B. With Leads Only
Figure 3 Leads (“pre-trends”) and lags for alternative estimators, CPS data, 1990-2010.
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fixed effects (the standard panel data model), we do not see evidence of a large accu-
mulated negative effect in the period up to the minimum wage increase (i.e., the “pre-
trends” that ADRZ claim plague the standard panel data estimator). The solid black
does tend to be more negative than positive for the leading effects, but it returns to
and goes above zero frequently. It is negative at a one-quarter lead, but that can be a
real effect. The second point that emerges from this figure is that the model with the
division × quarter interactions (the dashed line) actually looks worse, as it is persistently
negative for most of the leads. Our conclusion, thus far, is that there is really no
evidence to support ADRZ’s claim that the standard panel data model is flawed because
of strong pre-trends, in contrast to the model with spatial controls.
A second feature of Panel A of Figure 3 that is quite striking is that the estimates of
the actual effects of minimum wages on teen employment are very similar whether or
not the division × quarter interactions are included. Beginning at the contemporaneous
effect or a quarter earlier, the solid and dashed lines by and large coincide. Thus, in this
richer specification – allowing for leads and for longer lags – there is little evidence
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One interpretation of this similarity of the results is that the inclusion of the leading
effects controls for the kind of spatial heterogeneity that can make the comparison of
the post-treatment to pre-treatment levels of the dependent variable a biased estimate
of the treatment effect, yet without pinning identification on geographic proximity in
the way that ADR do.13 Panel B shows that the same conclusion emerges if we include only
leads – which we do not advocate, but which is closer to the estimates ADRZ present.14
Moreover, our reading of the estimates in Panel A, using either the standard panel
data model or adding the division × quarter interactions, is that there is a negative
downward shift in teen employment that is most apparent about four to eight quarters
after the minimum wage increase – consistent with a lagged effect discussed in much
of the literature. What is different when the division × quarter interactions are added is
that the estimates become much less precise. As can be seen by comparing Panels A
and B of Figure 4, the confidence intervals for the model with quarter × division inter-
actions added become much larger – sometimes as much as three times as large. In
NSW, we emphasized that the research design advocated by ADR (and DLR) seemed toA. Standard Panel Data Model 
B. With Quarter × Division Interactions Added
Figure 4 Leads (“pre-trends”) and lags, and 90% confidence intervals, for standard panel data
model and model with division × quarter interactions added, CPS data, 1990-2010.
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to relying on invalid identifying information that biased their estimates. Here we see that
in estimating richer models with leads and lags, there is also a large reduction in
precision when geographically proximate controls are included. If there was clear evi-
dence that this reduction in precision was necessary to remove an important source of
bias from the estimates, the ADR/DLR estimators might be preferred. But as we have
demonstrated in NSW and additionally in this paper (including in Figure 3), there is no
such evidence.
Figure 5 reports a similar analysis for the QCEW data used in DLR. Two of the lines
in Panel A contrast the estimates for the border pair sample with and without the inter-
actions between the dummy variables for contiguous cross-border county pairs and
quarter (these are the solid and dashed lines).15 There is an indication – albeit modest –
of lower employment beginning just prior to the minimum wage increase for the standard
panel data model and continuing throughout the post-treatment period. There is also a
slight indication of lower employment in the longer period leading up to the minimumA. With Leads and Lags
B. With 90% Confidence Intervals Added
Figure 5 Leads (“pre-trends”) and lags for alternative estimators, QCEW data, 1990-2010. Note: The
gray solid and dashed lines show the 90% confidence intervals for the corresponding point estimates
displayed in black.
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for the CPS, in this case, there is not a substantial decline in precision from including the
very large number of “spatial” controls in DLR’s specification (Panel B).
Finally, in Panel A, we also show the results for all counties (the dotted line), as op-
posed to the border county subsample one needs to use to implement DLR’s research
design using contiguous cross-border counties. Given that we have shown that there is
little justification for their research design, there is no reason to throw out information
on all the other counties. The dotted line indicates clearer evidence of a downward em-
ployment shift after the minimum wage increase, although there is a slight tendency
for lower employment before the minimum wage increase for this sample and specifica-
tion as well.
Figure 6 rescales the lead and lag effects to show the cumulative effects of the mini-
mum wage increase from one quarter prior to the increase (e.g., assuming that the one-
quarter leading coefficient represents a real effect of the minimum wage) to 12 quarters
after the minimum wage increase.16 The idea is to estimate the minimum wage effectA. Teen Employment, CPS Data, 1990-2010
B. Restaurant Employment, QCEW Data, 1990-2010
Figure 6 Estimated cumulative minimum wage effects beginning one quarter prior to minimum
wage increase, with 90% confidence intervals. Note: In Panels A and B, the gray solid and dashed lines
show the 90% confidence intervals for the corresponding point estimates displayed in black.
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for the possibility that there were employment changes prior to the minimum wage in-
crease in some of the treatment states. For the state data, the contemporaneous elasti-
cities are close to −0.2, building to a maximum of about −0.4 five quarters after the
increase – a period around which the estimates are significantly different from zero.
For the county-level analysis of restaurant employment using the border county sub-
sample, the elasticities are between −0.05 and −0.1 after about five quarters and hold
relatively steady through 12 quarters; these estimates are almost never significant.Issue 3: Controlling for spatial heterogeneity using state-specific trends with
different sample periods
A common robustness check in state-level panel data analyses is to include state-
specific trends (and similarly for other units of analysis). In the analysis in ADR, adding
linear state-specific trends to the specification eliminates the disemployment effects of
minimum wages. However, in NSW, we showed that the inclusion of state-specific
trends only eliminated the evidence of a negative effect of minimum wages under the
restrictive specification that these trends are linear, and when one included endpoints
of the sample period that included rather strong recessionary periods. We concluded
that ADR’s reliance on state-specific linear trends as part of their controls for “spatial
heterogeneity” was likely invalid (which is why in the previous section we focused on
the inclusion of the region × period controls), and established that their conclusions
about the effects of introducing state-specific trends as local controls were very fragile.
ADRZ contest our analysis by doing one of two things to eliminate the influence of
the problematic recessionary periods on the specifications with state-specific linear
trends: they either drop the quarters that corresponded to recessionary quarters as indi-
cated by NBER recession dates; or they include dummy variables interacting each of
these spells with state dummy variables. The results are described in Table 4. As in
NSW, we use data aggregated by state and quarter rather than micro-data, and do not
have demographic controls. But the estimates that correspond in the two papers areTable 4 The effects of the minimum wage on teen (16–19) employment, CPS data at
state-by-quarter level, 1990 – 2011:Q2
Dependent variable: Log (employment/population)
State and quarter
fixed effects





A. Full sample, original specification (N = 4,386)
Log(MW) -.165*** (.041) .009 (.058) -.074 (.078)
B. Include state- and spell-specific recession dummy variables
Log(MW) -.169*** (.042) .013 (.061) -.065 (.080)
C. Leave out recessions (N = 3,672)
Log(MW) -.166*** (.041) .026 (.061) -.060 (.074)
D. Leave out 1990–1993, 1998–2011 (N = 2,754)
Log(MW) -.148** (.060) … -.229** (.095)
Notes: Estimates are weighted by teen population. The specifications include the state unemployment rate for adults and
the relative size of youth population as controls. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *Statistically significant
at the .10 level; ** at the .05 level; *** at the .01 level.
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which correspond to ADRZ’s Appendix Table B2. With just fixed state and quarter ef-
fects, in column (1), the estimated minimum wage elasticity is −0.17 for the entire sam-
ple period (row A). Doing the two things ADRZ suggest – leaving out recessions or
including recessions-state interactions (rows B and C) – the estimates barely change
relative to Panel A. The evidence they emphasize is in column (2), where they show
that the estimated elasticity is near zero and does not change appreciably with their ap-
proaches to removing the effects of the recessions when they include the state-specific
linear trends.
Note, however, that ADRZ also include the Census division-quarter interactions in
these specifications. When we restrict attention to what happens to the specifications
with only the linear trends added (column 3), the estimates are more negative, although
not statistically significant. Still, they are not very sensitive to the two ways ADRZ
propose – in rows B and C – to account for recessions.
As Figure 7 makes clear, however, the correspondence between the recession dates
and when labor markets were in very weak territory is highly imperfect, as the reces-
sions’ impacts extended well beyond the official recession dates. Indeed when ADRZ
drop only the recession periods, they include the periods after the recessions when
labor market performance was even worse. Thus, their alternative specifications do not
solve the endpoint bias problem, as the labor market was still very weak after the end
of the early recession in 1991:Q1, as well as after the Great Recession’s official ending
date of 2009:Q2. This is why we dropped longer periods at the beginning and end of
the sample period. As already noted, and as shown in row D of the table, when we do
this (or any of the other things we do to get more robust estimates of the trends), we
get strong negative disemployment effects.17
ADRZ also criticize another approach we use – using a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter
to detrend the data. They suggest that this approach is inconsistent with our motivation
“that cyclical downturns may be problematic to include” and hence suggest that “it is
odd to hone in on the variation that the HP filter characterizes as business cycleFigure 7 Aggregate and teenage unemployment rates. Note: The gray bars indicate recessionary
quarters based on NBER business cycle dates.
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per se. The problem we were emphasizing is that the business cycle can inappropriately
influence the estimates of the linear trends when the endpoints include the effects of
sharp downturns. In contrast, we do not want to discount the information on what
happens to teen employment during recessions in relation to the minimum wage, but
rather to avoid this information being down-weighted by fitting trends through these
recessionary periods. Thus, the motivation for the filtering is to extract the trend in a
manner that is less sensitive to the endpoint problem – which we do with the HP filter,
as well as a more brute-force way of removing the trend using peak-to-peak compari-
sons and including non-linear state-specific trends.18
At the end of the day, ADRZ appear to concede, as our work established, that esti-
mates that attempt to remove long-run trends are sensitive to parametric assumptions.
However, this strikes us as a far cry from their original conclusions. For example, in the
original paper ADR wrote: “These results indicate that estimates of minimum wage em-
ployment effects using the standard fixed-effects model of specification 1 are contami-
nated by heterogeneous employment patterns across states. Allowing for long-term
differential state trends makes the employment estimates indistinguishable from zero”
(2011, p. 220). Rather, they should have concluded, at most, that the estimates are sen-
sitive to how one controls for these trends. Furthermore, nothing in this exchange un-
dermines our main point that there are many sensible things one can do to avoid the
problem of the business cycle influencing the estimates of long-run trends, and that the
evidence from nearly all of these – except a couple of restrictive or inappropriate ap-
proaches – points to disemployment effects of minimum wages.Issue 4: Placebo/falsification test for spatial heterogeneity
As one way of testing for spatial heterogeneity bias in the standard panel data model,
DLR conduct a placebo or falsification test by estimating the “effects” of the cross-
border minimum wage – which should not have a real effect but could have a spurious
negative effect if the cross-border county is subject to the same negative shocks associ-
ated with minimum increases. They argue that their evidence establishes that the
standard panel data estimator fails this test, exhibiting disemployment effects of mini-
mum wages when there is no minimum wage variation.
Placebo tests can be a useful way to assess whether treatment effects are real or
spurious, but in NSW, we argued that DLR’s test was invalid because federal minimum
wage changes across the border would also imply minimum wage changes in the state
in question, so that the cross-border minimum wage assigned to placebo observations
is contaminated with actual minimum wage variation. We therefore restricted the pla-
cebo sample not only to observations where the minimum wage was never above the
federal minimum wage, but also limited the sample to when there was no federal mini-
mum wage variation (and also examined a more-restrictive sample that included only
county pairs with a minimum wage difference for at least one quarter). In these analyses,
we find no statistical evidence of spurious disemployment effects of minimum wages.
ADRZ take issue with our critique of the falsification test in DLR. In particular, they
state that we “misunderstood this entire exercise” and “the basic sources of statistical vari-
ation used in a fixed effects model” (p. 76). In fact, their argument is simply incorrect.
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always prevails, so MWst
S =MWt
F for all t, and let S’ denote the bordering state, then
the regression model
Est¼ γMWstSþ δMWstS’ þ Dsθ þ Dtλ þ εst ð3Þ
is the same asEst¼ γMWtFþ δMWstS’ þ Dsθ þ Dtλ þ εst ð4Þ
because MWst
S =MWt
F.Clearly in equation (4), γ is unidentified since the federal minimum wage is perfectly
collinear with the period dummy variables, and we get the same estimate of δ even if
we drop MWst
S (= MWt
F) and just estimate
Est¼ δMWstS’ þ Dsθ þ Dtλ þ εst: ð5Þ
This is the equation DLR estimate, and in which, they argue, the estimate of δ pro-
vides a falsification or placebo test.
Based on the equations above, ADRZ argue that federal minimum wage variation is ir-
relevant and cannot be contaminating the falsification experiment.19 However, this is not
true. MWt
F is perfectly collinear with the period fixed effects. But MWst
S’ in equation (5)
varies with the federal minimum wage in a way that is not perfectly correlated with the
period fixed effects, because whether the federal minimum wage variation changes the
cross-border minimum wage depends on whether the state or federal minimum wage is
binding. Thus, federal minimum variation is not swept out by the period fixed effects, and
therefore the cross-border minimum wage variation will be correlated with the actual
state minimum wage variation.
Another way to see this is to note that the regression they estimate for their placebo test is
Est ¼ δ MWtF⋅ I MWstS’¼ MWtF
  þ MWstS’⋅ I MWstS’> MWtF
 Þ þ Dsθ þ Dtλ þ εst;

ð6Þ
where I{∙} is the indicator function. That is, there is a single minimum wage coefficient
that is constrained to be the same whether or not the minimum wage variation is com-
ing from the federal minimum wage or the state minimum wage across the border.
Clearly the federal variation can play a role here because the federal minimum wage is
multiplied by a dummy that is sometimes one and sometimes zero, breaking the perfect
collinearity with the time fixed effects.
An obvious way to verify that federal minimum wage variation plays a role is to vary
artificially the federal minimum wage, always being careful to keep track of what this
does to state minimum wages in the cross-border state – nothing if it stays below the
state minimum, but changing it if the federal minimum wage is binding. If we do this,
and the estimated minimum wage effect in equation (5) changes, then clearly the fed-
eral minimum wage variation plays a role. As documented in Table 5, columns (2) and
(3), this does in fact change the estimated effect of the cross-border minimum wage in
DLR’s placebo sample and regression, relative to the estimates in column (1), which
come from their paper.
Table 5 The effects of the minimum wage on log restaurant employment, “falsification tests,” county-level QCEW data
Dependent variable: Log (restaurant employment)
DLR estimates False variation in federal minimum wage Correct Maryland minimum wage error








wage always = $3.35

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Actual MW sample:
Log(MW) −0.208 (0.150) … … −0.114 (0.155) −0.198** (0.079) −0.174** (0.085)
Placebo MW sample:
Log(MW) −0.123 (0.158) −0.111 (0.157) −0.099** (0.042) −0.125 (0.134) −0.088 (0.062) 0.035 (0.100)
Notes: All specifications include period and county fixed effects, and controls for population and private-sector employment. Standard errors are clustered at the state level. *Statistically significant at the .10 level;
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that is influential in this analysis. (It was not influential in other analyses.) They have a
higher minimum wage in Maryland in the first six months of 2006 – $6.15, instead of
the $5.15 federal minimum wage that actually prevailed. The effects of this error are il-
lustrated in the final three columns of Table 5. When the corrected data are used, but
with their sample (column (4)), the estimates are very similar for the actual minimum
wage sample and the placebo sample (−0.114 and −0.125). Thus, in this case there is
perhaps not even a basis for a placebo test since the initial estimate is quite small.
Nonetheless, with the corrected data, the estimates for columns (5) and (6) – which
avoid the problem with their placebo test being invalid – parallel those in our paper.
The column (5) estimates are −0.198 (0.079) for the actual sample and −0.088 (0.062)
for the placebo sample, and the column (6) estimates are −0.174 (0.085) and 0.035
(0.100), respectively. Thus, with the corrected data, we get a clear negative estimate for
the actual data and no effect for the placebo sample – exactly what should happen if
the negative estimated employment effect is not driven by a spurious correlation of
minimum wage increases and negative shocks that are common across the border, but
instead represents a real effect of the minimum wage.
Why might focusing on local variation produce biased estimates of minimum
wage effects?
ADRZ assert that the basis of our critique was that their spatial controls “discard too
much variation to find any significant effects” (p. 22). This assertion is incorrect; in
NSW, we did not focus on the loss of precision. Rather, after testing the restrictions
entailed by their local estimators, we concluded that the evidence indicated that DLR
(and ADR) were arbitrarily throwing away lots of valid identifying information and
potentially focusing on variation that generated biased estimates. It is the case, however,
that in longer-term dynamic models, loss of precision is an issue as well, as we note in
this paper.
Nonetheless, in NSW, we did not offer an explanation of why DLR (or ADR’s) esti-
mates based on local comparisons generate biased estimates of minimum wage effects,
in particular estimates biased upward toward zero. There is actually a relatively simple
potential explanation for this bias. Baskaya and Rubinstein (2012) find that when the
interaction between the federal minimum wage variation and the propensity for the
federal minimum wage to bind in a state is used as an instrumental variable for the pre-
vailing state minimum wage, stronger negative disemployment effects result compared
to the standard panel data estimator.
A natural interpretation of this evidence is that because state minimum wages tend
to be more similar to those in nearby states than in states farther away, when the iden-
tifying variation is restricted to same-division or cross-border states, much of the
identifying information from federal minimum wage variation is eliminated. Instead,
identification comes more from state variation that is unrelated to federal variation,
which is more likely to be associated with positive endogeneity bias that comes from
policymakers tending to raise the minimum wage when the labor market is stronger.
Baskaya and Rubinstein present some indirect evidence consistent with this, finding
that in states where the minimum wage is generally above the federal minimum wage,
the minimum wage moves pro-cyclically with about a one-year lag with respect to the
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mum wages binds is not correlated with the lagged unemployment rate. Of course we
are more concerned about endogeneity with respect to low-skill labor markets per se.
More generally, restricting the usable variation to narrow regions does not necessarily
produce less biased estimates of minimum wage effects. In particular, including re-
gion × period interactions can wipe out the across-region variation in minimum wages
attributable to influences like changes in inequality, union strength, or the federal mini-
mum wage that are largely exogenous with respect to shocks to local low-skill labor
markets and which differ more across regions than within regions.20 In contrast, we
might ask why minimum wage changes differ in similar, nearby states in the same
period. Our conjecture is that the within-region and within-period variation is driven
more by unmeasured variation in low-skill labor market conditions to which policy-
makers respond by raising minimum wages when these conditions are strong, generat-
ing positive bias in the estimated employment effect of minimum wages. The findings
in Baskaya and Rubinstein (2012) are consistent with this conjecture.
A useful analogy comes from Griliches’ (1979) seminal work on twin or sibling esti-
mates of the economic returns to schooling. The simplest intuition is that if we include
family fixed effects, or equivalently look only at within-family variation in schooling
and wages, then bias from omitted unobservables at the family level is reduced.
Griliches pointed out, however, that whether or not this is true depends on what gener-
ates variation within versus across families. In particular, if family influences or “back-
ground” common to both siblings or twins are relatively important in determining
schooling, then the remaining within-family differences can be more reflective of ability
differences to which schooling responds, in which case the within-family estimate of
the return to schooling can be more biased than estimates using across-family vari-
ation. This parallels the case above when the within-region and period variation in
minimum wages is more closely related to unmeasured variation in local low-skill
labor markets than is the across-region (and period) variation. In contrast, if within-
family schooling differences are less driven by the common influences on siblings or
twins, then more of the within-family differences are determined by factors other than
ability, and the within-family estimate will be less biased. This corresponds to the sce-
nario ADR and DLR assume, in which the within-region and period variation in mini-
mum wages is more exogenous to local labor market conditions. However, we have
explained that the available evidence suggests that the former scenario may be more
plausible.
ADRZ assert, with respect to their inclusion of period-region fixed effects, that,
“there are only two acceptable reasons to avoid controlling for this heterogeneity. (1)
The inclusion of the controls substantially reduces statistical power. (2) The treatment
affects the control variables themselves, such as through spillover effects on neighbor-
ing areas” (p. 36). But as Griliches’ work demonstrates – and the point has been echoed
repeatedly in research with panel data where the issue is isomorphic to DLR’s saturated
models that focus on local variation – this statement is simply incorrect. Controlling
for heterogeneity changes the identifying variation and can, under some circumstances,
exacerbate other biases. And in this particular case, the upward endogeneity bias that
we might expect in estimating the effects of minimum wages on employment is more
likely to emerge with the inclusion of local controls.
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Our original paper (NSW, 2014) faulted two previous analyses by authors of ADRZ
implementing research designs that change the comparison groups used in estimating
the employment effects of minimum wages (ADR, 2011; DLR, 2010). Focusing on the
key innovation in these papers – the use of geographically proximate areas as local con-
trols – we concluded that while these research designs have some intuitive appeal a
priori, the key identifying assumption underlying them – which generated the finding
of no disemployment effects – was not supported by the data. In addition, when the
data were used to pick out the best control regions for areas treated by a higher mini-
mum wage, the standard disemployment effects were confirmed for teenagers using
CPS data. The evidence for restaurant employment using QCEW data remains more am-
biguous. Thus, our paper substantially undermined the contentions in ADR and DLR that
essentially most of the research literature preceding their work, relying on conventional
panel data estimators with fixed period and area (usually state) effects, used flawed com-
parison areas that generated spurious evidence of disemployment effects.
ADRZ are equally sweeping in their criticism of our evaluation, presenting a litany of
criticisms of both our analyses and results and concluding that the findings in ADR
and DLR stand. In this paper, we have attempted to highlight the main issues under de-
bate regarding the selection of comparison areas or groups and demonstrate that the
criticisms that ADRZ level at our analysis of these issues are unfounded. Indeed, we
think it more likely that the restricted comparison groups they use result in estimates
of minimum wage effects that are biased toward finding no disemployment effect. Fi-
nally, in a richer specification that includes leads and lags of minimum wages,
prompted by specifications that ADRZ report, it is not even clear that the spatial het-
erogeneity controls that ADR used have much effect on the minimum wage effects esti-
mated from the standard panel data model with fixed time and state effects.
At the end of the day, then, we end up where we started. We see the evidence as still
pointing to disemployment effects for low-skilled workers from raising the minimum
wage, with elasticities that are often around −0.2 for the teenagers on whom we focus.
This evidence continues to be consistent with the comprehensive research literature
reviewed in Neumark and Wascher (2007).
We are not under the illusion that our assessment of ADRZ’s paper will settle the issue
for all parties. The minimum wage-employment debate is contentious, and there is a con-
tinuing flow of new work that introduces new ideas or approaches pertaining to this de-
bate, focusing in part on the same issue of the appropriate comparison groups for
estimating minimum wage effects (e.g., Meer and West 2013; Aaronson et al., 2013).21
Indeed, given the potential endogeneity of minimum wage policy, we think it is im-
portant for researchers to continue their efforts to obtain more compelling identifica-
tion of the effects of minimum wages. This is indeed the goal pursued by ADR and
DLR, which in itself is commendable, even if the evidence indicates that their approach
generates minimum-wage employment effects that are biased toward zero. We think
the best study in this vein is the one by Baskaya and Rubinstein (2012), which uses an
instrumental variable that relies on federally-induced minimum wage variation that is
exogenous to the state and finds stronger evidence of disemployment effects, with elas-
ticities often in the range of −0.4 or larger. In our view, then, the most recent evidence
that merits serious consideration challenges the consensus view from the other side –
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workers are substantially stronger than indicated by previous estimated elasticities in
the range of −0.1 to −0.2. But this, too, will surely not be the last word.Endnotes
1We focus to some extent on the results for teenagers using the CPS for three reasons.
First, most of the debate in the literature is about estimated employment effects for low-
skilled groups defined by age or other demographic characteristics, generally using the CPS.
Second, for a number of reasons, predictions of disemployment effects are less clear for a
single industry – including the restaurant industry where many workers are tipped. And
third, the differences in the alternative estimates are most evident for the CPS teen results,
which is where the disemployment effects predicted by the neoclassical model are sharpest.
2Because we do not rehash all of the details of the analyses from the prior papers,
readers may find it useful to refer to NSW and ADRZ for a fuller understanding of the
material we cover.
3Although the discussion here is in the context of the state-level analysis, the same
argument applies to the county-level analysis.
4By “treatment” we mean a case where there is a minimum wage increase in a state that
can be compared against non-treated states; the treatment is the minimum wage increase.
5It is not clear whether 0.938 or 0.925 is a more accurate characterization of the rela-
tive weights, although they are so close it hardly matters. Of course, neither is inform-
ative about the distribution of the relative weights across treatments, which is why we
summarized the results in distributional terms in NSW.
6ADRZ object to our “using residuals from an OLS panel regression as the matching
variable in a synthetic control study” (p. 65). However, we also present results from a
synthetic control analysis that matches on various forms of the dependent variable, as
well as one that matches on residuals from a specification that restricts the minimum
wage coefficient to be zero (what ADRZ argue is the actual effect of minimum wages
on employment). As we noted in our earlier paper, these alternative matching algo-
rithms yielded very similar answers.
Allegretto et al. (2013b) also argue that the approach of matching on residuals is wrong
because of “confusion between estimated and true residuals. By construction, estimated
OLS residuals are uncorrelated with all regressors, including the minimum wage” (p. 28).
Thus, they argue, the residuals are uninformative because they are “mean-zero errors that
are uncorrelated with the minimum wage” (p. 28). It is of course true that the contempor-
aneous least-squares residuals are uncorrelated with the regressors by construction. But
the matching is on lagged residuals, which are not uncorrelated by construction.
7One notable exception is for the West North Central states, where the weight in
column (3) is 0.098, vs. 0.009 in column (8). But as shown in NSW (2014, Table 2), if
we run the standard panel data model for this division, we get a standard disemploy-
ment elasticity of about −0.19, which is statistically significant. This kind of evidence
for the West North Central states in NSW led to the conclusion that “(a) in most
cases, there is little rationale for ADR’s choice to focus only on the within-division
variation to identify minimum wage effects; and (b) when there is a good rationale for
doing this, the evidence shows negative and statistically significant effects of minimum
Neumark et al. IZA Journal of Labor Policy 2014, 3:24 Page 24 of 26
http://www.izajolp.com/content/3/1/24wages on teen employment, with elasticities that are in or near the −0.1 to −0.2 range”
(p. 627).
8We use the centroids of each state (county) in calculating the distances between them,
and we non-parametrically estimate the average synthetic control weight by distance from
treatment state (county) using locally-weighted regression (lowess command in Stata). In
implementing lowess, we vary the smoothing method (running-line least squares, which is
the default, or running-mean) and bandwidth used (the default 0.8 or a narrower 0.4).
9The right-hand tails reflect distances from Hawaii and Alaska to select states, and
hence are not very reliable.
10ADRZ have to date declined to provide their data and code with which we could
compare ours.
11Additional discussion of our conclusions regarding state-specific linear trends ap-
pears below.
12A real effect can also presumably arise with a short lead, owing to employers’ re-
sponses to soon-to-be-implemented minimum wage increases.
13As ADRZ point out, another way to control for prior changes in the model with
state/county and period fixed effects is to include lagged dependent variables (LDVs).
Here too, we came up with results that are quite different from what ADRZ present in
columns (3)-(4) of their Table 4; in particular, we still find significant negative employ-
ment effects for teens in the CPS data. Using quarterly CPS data from 1990 to 2010,
our estimates show a teen employment elasticity that ranges from −0.057 to −0.108
(one-quarter LDV) or from −0.034 to −0.071 (one- to four-quarter LDV), with all the
estimates statistically significant. This contrasts with their estimates, which range from
−0.004 to −0.076 (one-year LDV using annual CPS data from 1990 to 2012), with the
latter estimate statistically significant only at the 10% level.
14A footnote in NSW also reported results using bordering state pairs instead of
Census divisions to construct controls, more closely paralleling the county-level re-
search design in DLR. This approach tends to give stronger evidence of disemployment
effects than ADR’s research design based on Census divisions. However, there is a bit
more evidence of negative pre-trends for this specification, although nothing as severe
as what ADRZ report; and there is a sharper negative shift after the minimum wage
takes effect. (See Additional file 1: Figure A1.)
15These QCEW estimates are for the specifications that include the private-sector em-
ployment control, and both use the contiguous border county pair sample originally used in
DLR. Note that in ADRZ’s Figure 6, the sample used in what is presented as estimates for
the canonical model is different – it is the all counties sample, which is not directly compar-
able to the contiguous border county pair sample used for the local controls model.
16To do this, we subtract out the cumulative effect through two quarters prior to the
minimum wage increase.
17ADRZ obfuscate the issue by questioning whether the periods we omit constitute “reces-
sions” (their footnote 49). The NBER recession dates do not include the entire periods of 1990–
1993 and 2008–2011, and we never stated that we were explicitly leaving out recessions based
on their formal start and stop dates. The data in Figure 7 clearly point to labor markets in which
both aggregate and teen unemployment were unusually high in these periods. We are also well
aware that there was a recession in 2001, but we explicitly discussed the problem of recessionary
periods coming at the beginning or end of periods over which trends are estimated.
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used to detrend panel data in applied microeconomics papers, especially when the
panels consist of aggregate data for geographic areas across time. For an example using
data for U.S. states, see Ionides et al. (2013), who make a similar point to ours about
using nonlinear detrending techniques. In addition, the reference entry for the STATA
command “tsfilter hp” explicitly indicates that it is designed to be compatible with
panel data and that the filtering is done separately on each panel.
19They do not quite say it this way. Rather, they write (of minimum wages): “They are
changing, however, in exactly the same way in all counties in the placebo sample, since
they all pay the federal minimum and are fully correlated with time effects. In other
words, there is zero cross-sectional variation in minimum wages in the sample” (p. 76).
The language is a little imprecise, but their argument must be that the federal mini-
mum wage variation is completely absorbed in the period fixed effects, and therefore
there is no remaining minimum wage variation in the placebo sample to be “predicted”
by the federal minimum wage.
20ADRZ document, in their Table 1, that high minimum wage states tend to differ
from low minimum wage states in terms of unionization, voting patterns, changes in
inequality, and the business cycle. As we argued in NSW (2014), differences in the busi-
ness cycle are captured in the aggregate labor market controls included in the models.




Additional file 1: Figure A1. Leads (“pre-trends”) and lags for alternative estimators, adding paired-state border
design, CPS Data, 1990-2010.
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